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Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States
(No. 348-68-January 23, 1970)*
The following opinion (and concurring opinion) of the United States Court
of Claims arises out of certain cases theretofore decided by the United States
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. The case is considered to be of
some international interest, and the opinions are accordingly reproduced in
full hereunder.- Ed.
On Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's
Cross-motion for Summary Judgment
COLLINS, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:
This case involves a claim by Aris Gloves, Inc., a California corpo-
ration, that certain of its properties located in East Germany and Czech-
oslovakia were unlawfully taken by the United States in violation of the
just compensation clause of the fifth amendment and in breach of an
implied contract by the Government to fully compensate plaintiff for its
losses. The controversy is now before this court on defendant's motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment and plaintiff's cross-motion for summary
judgment. We find as a matter of law that, based on the particular facts of
this case, plaintiff is not entitled to recover either under the fifth amend-
ment or on the basis of an implied contract. Consequently, for the reasons
hereinafter shown, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be grant-
ed.
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, plaintiff was the owner of three
glove manufacturing plants-two of which were located in Czechoslovakia
and one in East Germany. When the United States entered the war in
December of 1941, all of the above-mentioned properties were seized by
the Germans on the ground that they were United States enemy property.
Toward the end of the war, in early 1945, the territory in which plaintiff's
three plants were located was liberated from German occupation and
control by the United States Army, and plaintiff's possessions came under
the authority of the United States Military Command. This country re-
mained in control of this area until August 2, 1945, when the Treaty of
Potsdam' was signed, whereby all of Germany was divided into zones of
*Since making up this issue of The International Lawyer, the official report of this case
has appeared at 420 F.2d 1386.
'The groundwork for the Conference at Potsdam (July 17-Aug. 2, 1945) had been laid
previously at the Yalta Conference in early February of 1945. At Yalta, the United States,
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed that upon the final defeat of Germany,
each power (and possibly France) would take control of a separate "zone of occupation." It
was further agreed that, within 2 years from the surrender of Germany, removals of all
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occupation- each zone being supervised by one of the major Allied powers.
The area in which plaintiffs East German plant was located was in-
corporated into the Russian zone of occupation. Thereupon, in accordance
with the Potsdam Agreement, which authorized the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) to dismantle and remove all industrial equip-
ment in the eastern zone of occupation as soon as possible, Russia pro-
ceeded to dismantle and remove the industrial equipment and machinery
from plaintiffs East German plant. At or about the same time, the territory
in Czechoslovakia containing plaintiffs other two plants was released from
United States control and restored to the Czechoslovakian government.
Thereafter, plans were formulated by Czechoslovakian officials to restore
all wartime confiscations to their rightful owners. However, before this
restitution program could be carried out, a Communist regime took control
of the Czechoslovakian government, and plaintiffs plants were nation-
alized. Consequently, as a result of the war, all three of plaintiffs glove
manufacturing plants were confiscated, but without the payment of any
compensation by any of the three countries involved (Germany, Russia, or
Czechoslovakia).
Several years later, Congress passed the War Claims Act of 19482 which
allowed for the compensation of claims of American military and civilian
personnel who had suffered losses as a result of enemy action during the
war. However, plaintiff was not allowed to recover under this act until an
amendment was passed in 1962,3 which allowed for the compensation of
claims by United States nationals attributable to the loss or destruction of
property located in Germany and Czechoslovakia.
In 1950 the International Claims Settlement Act of 19494 was passed
which was designed to compensate American citizens for their losses
stemming from nationalizations or other such losses caused by certain
foreign governments. The 1958 amendment 5 to this act authorized the
payment of claims against the Government of Czechoslovakia based on
nationalization and confiscation of American property in that country.
Plaintiff filed a claim under the 1958 amendment for the loss of its two
plants in Czechoslovakia and received an award covering the value of the
properties. This award of $685,452.03 consisted of principal amounting to
$451,600 plus interest ($233,852.03) at the rate of 6 percent per annum
from 1949 to 1958. Plaintiffs claim for loss of profits was denied. Since the
industrial equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, etc., located on German territory,
should be made for the purpose of "destroying the war potential of Germany."
250 U.S.C. App. §§ 2001-17 (1964),formerly 62 Stat. 1240 (1948.
3War Claims Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2017 (1964).
422 U.S.C. §§ 1621-43 (1964),formerly 64 Stat. 12 (1950).5 International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1642 (1964).
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Czechoslovakian claims fund was insufficient to cover all the awards in
full, plaintiff was awarded a pro rata share of the fund which came to
$37,302.25.
When the 1962 amendment to the War Claims Act was passed, plaintiff
proceeded to file two claims with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commis-
sion. 6 In one claim plaintiff was seeking additional compensation for the
loss of the properties in Czechoslovakia. This claim was rejected because
the loss was due to a postwar nationalization rather than as a direct
consequence of "special measures" taken by German authorities.
Plaintiff's second claim was for the loss of its plant in East Germany. In
this action, plaintiff was awarded the sum of $462,528.52-an amount
equal to the physical value of the plant at the time it was seized by
Germany in 1942. Because Plaintiff was found to be a small business
concern, the award was paid in full.7 However, no interest was paid on any
awards under the General War Claims Program.
Later in 1967 plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to recover the
full value of its lost properties, including interest and loss of profits.
Plaintiff also applied for injunctive relief and sought the convening of a
three-judge court. Plaintiff's request for a three-judge court was denied on
May 1, 1967,8 and this decision was affirmed on appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on May 16,
1967.9 Thereafter, on September 8, 1967, plaintiff's suit in the district court
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 10 On November 21, 1968, plaintiff
filed suit in this court seeking full compensation for the value of its proper-
ties in East Germany and Czechoslovakia which were allegedly taken by
the United States."
6The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, established by Reorganization Plan No. I
of 1954, 68 Stat. 1279 (1954), 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15 (1964), is the successor agency to the War
Claims Commission created by the War Claims Act of 1948 and the International Claims
Commission created by the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.7War Claims Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2017(a)(1)(1964), authorizes the Secretary
of the Treasury to make full payment of awards to claimants certified by the Small Business
Administration as having been, on the date of the loss, a small business concern within the
meaning of the Small Business Act.
8Aris Gloves, Inc. v. Re, Civil No. 929-67 (D. D.C., May 1, 1967). In reaching his
decision, Judge Walsh concluded that Plaintiff had no vested property interest, protected by
the fifth amendment, as the result of Title II of the War Claims Act of 1948; that there existed
no constitutional question under the "just compensation" clause or the equal protection
clause; that the question of payment of interest involved only an interpretation of the statute
in question and not an illegal delegation of legislative authority; and that there was no question
raised as to the constitutionality of a United States statute.
9Aris Gloves, Inc. v. Walsh, No. 20,984 (D.C. Cir., May 16, 1967).
1
°Aris Gloves, Inc. v. Re. Civil No. 929-67 (D. D.C., Sept. 8, 1967). Judge Holtzoff, in
his order, stated that "if plaintiffs have a valid claim under the Fifth Amendment, this Court
lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter."
"Plaintiff's petition, in this case, seeks compensation for the value of its properties taken
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Plaintiff's leading argument is that property in East Germany was un-
lawfully taken by the United States in violation of the just compensation
clause of the fifth amendment. In order to understand plaintiff's rather
unique fifth amendment position in this case, it is best to outline its
"taking" argument in full.
In April or May of 1945, United States forces completely took control
from the Germans of the territory in East Germany containing plaintiff's
glove manufacturing plant. Prior to this time, the United States had agreed
at the Yalta Conference' 2 to allow Russia to dismantle and remove Ger-
man industrial plants in settlement of Russia's reparation claims against
Germany. By July of 1945, the United States knew that Russia was in fact
removing not only German properties but also properties belonging to
United States nationals.' 3 Aware of this fact, the United States still went
ahead and agreed at the Potsdam Conference to turn over the territory
which it was occupying in East Germany to the Soviet Union without
demanding full compensation for the loss of any property belonging to a
United States citizen. There had, in fact, been a proposal drafted by the
United States delegation to Potsdam which offered a plan whereby United
States nationals owning property in Germany would be compensated for
any losses sustained as the result of the removal of such property for war
reparations. However, this proposal was never discussed at the Confer-
ence, and ultimately it was withdrawn by Secretary of State Byrnes on
August 1, 1945-one day before the close of the Conference. 14
Plaintiff contends that the above set of circumstances amounted to a
taking of its property by the defendant without just compensation. Plaintiff
in both Germany and Czechoslovakia. However, in its corssmotion for summary judgment,
plaintiff completely fails to make reference to its Czechoslovakian claim. At oral argument,
plaintiff's counsel stated that Aris Gloves, at the moment, was seeking recovery only for its
loss of property in East Germany. He conceded that the Czechoslovakian claim involved
other and different issues from the German claim, and, consequently, the Czechoslovakian
question would be handled separately in another action.
In the best interests of justice, we will consider plaintiff to have withdrawn its claim in this
suit for compensation for loss of property in Czechoslovakia, rather than hold that such claim
is waived and thereby lost. This decision will be without prejudice to the right of plaintiff to
file another action in this court for the recovery of the value of its property located in
Czechoslovakia.12 See note I supra and accompanying text.
13 Letter from Edwin W. Pauley to James F. Byrnes, July 27, 1945. In this letter, Pauley,
who was the representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations, stated that the
Russians had virtually removed all machinery from five plants located in the American area of
Berlin-two of the plants being the property of the International Telephone and Telegraph
Company. Pauley also noted that such removals were in complete violation of efforts to
maintain "non-war potential" industries in Germany, thereby not completely destroying all
opportunities for employment.
14 1t appears that the proposal was circulated to the British and Soviet delegations but
apparently was never discussed.
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argues that the signing of the Potsdam Treaty, relinquishing control of the
territory containing plaintiff's glove manufacturing plant, and the failure of
the United States to press for compensation for the loss of property
belonging to American citizens, in essence, amounted to a licensing of the
Russian government to dismantle and carry away plaintiff's property with-
out having to pay compensation. Consequently, it is plaintiff's position that
the United States should be obliged to compensate it for its losses since
defendant failed to protect its property interests, and since defendant even
went to the point of actually authorizing a third party to take control of
plaintiff's property without first requiring just compensation.
In answering plaintiff's argument, defendant contends that there was no
taking at all by the United States, but rather that the taking of plaintiff's
property was accomplished by the Soviet Union, for whose actions the
United States can not be made liable. Defendant further argues that, if
there was a taking, it was justified since it was the result of belligerent
occupation by the United States. To support this contention, defendant
refers to the general rule that all property located in enemy territory,
regardless of its ownership, is in time of war regarded as enemy property
subject to the laws of war. Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39 (1877);
Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187 (1875); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States,
212 U.S. 297 (1909).
This court will readily concede that it was not necessary for the defend-
ant to have actually taken physical possession of plaintiff's property in
order for there to have been a fifth amendment taking. A taking can occur
simply when the Government by its action deprives the owner of all or
most of his interest in his property. See R. J. Widen Co. v. United States,
174 Ct. Cl. 1020, 1028, 357 F.2d 988, 993 (1966); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). Just as a taking can
occur when the owner is deprived of the use of this property, United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), so also can there be a taking if the
Government makes it possible for someone else to obtain the use or benefit
of another person's property. E.g., see Eyherabide v. United States, 170
Ct. Cl. 598, 606, 345 F.2d 565, 570 (1965), where the court remarked: "If
the Government's encroachments on private property make it possible for
another to get the benefits of that property, the United States is liable just
as if it used the property for itself." Thus, it is the loss to the owner of the
property and not the accretion to the Government which is controlling in
fifth amendment cases. See United States v. Causby, supra at 261; R. J.
Widen Co. v. United States, supra, Eyherabide v. United States, supra.
The fact remains, however, that despite the existence and validity of
these general principles governing the definition of a taking, they still do
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not create a fifth amendment violation in the instant case. Despite all the
many cases cited by plaintiff to support its general rules of law, not one of
them deals with a factual situation similar to the present case. The question
of whether there is a fifth amendment taking cannot turn simply on general
principles of law; it must be based on the particular circumstances of each
case. See United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168
(1958); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
Consequently, our decision is based not only on the general rules relating
to the just compensation clause, but also on a careful consideration of the
unique factual situation which exists in the present case.
The prime situation which did exist at the time of the alleged taking was
that the United States was engaged in a war. Therefore, this case must be
governed by those taking cases which deal with wartime appropriations of
individually owned property. The case of Juragua Iron Co. v. United
States, supra, was one in which there was a taking of American-owned
property located in foreign enemy territory by American military forces
during a period of war. Thus, this case presents a factual situation which
contains the same basic elements as the case at hand. The Court in
Juragua held that despite the fact that the land appropriated for military
use was owned by an American citizen, the taking still would be governed
by the general rule that property found in enemy territory is enemy proper-
ty regardless of the status of the owner. See Lamar v. Browne, supra. The
Court of Claims, which initially decided the Juragua case, stated in its
opinion:
The law seems to be well settled that when a citizen of one belligerent
country is doing business in the other belligerent country and has built up and
purchased property there which has a permanent situs, such property is
subject to the same treatment as property of the enemy. * * *
Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 99, 111-12 (1907). On
appeal, this idea was affirmed emphatically by the Supreme Court. 15 The
mere fact that the property taken in Juragua was physically occupied by
American military forces, whereas there was no physical occupation in the
instant case, should not be a distinguishing factor since, as we have already
conceded, actual physical taking is not necessary in order for there to be a
15The Court stated:
* * * The plaintiff, although an American corporation, doing business in Cuba, was, during
the war with Spain, to be deemed an enemy to the United States with respect of its property
found and then used in that country, and such property could be regarded as enemy's
property, liable to be seized and confiscated by the United States in the progress of the war
then being prosecuted; indeed, subject under the laws of war to be destroyed whenever, in the
conduct of military operations, its destruction was necessary for the safety of our troops or to
weaken the power of the enemy." Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. at 306.
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fifth amendment violation. The fact remains that in both cases there was an
exercise of control by the defendant over the plaintiffs' property, such that
each plaintiff lost possession of its property. We feel that just as the Court
in Juragua found that there was no taking compensable under the fifth
amendment, so we likewise hold that there was no taking in this case which
should be compensated under the fifth amendment.
It should be noted further that the Court of Claims in deciding Juragua
even went to the point of ruling that if the plaintiff's property was not
considered as "enemy property," there would still be no means of recovery
for the plaintiff since the destruction of the property was justified by the
necessity of carrying on military operations. Cf. Pacific R.R. v. United
States 120 U.S. 227 (1887). Despite the fact that the Supreme Court did
not directly affirm this particular point on appeal, it is obvious from the
Court's opinion that its decision was based upon the necessities created by
the existence of a state of war. In United States v. Central Eureka Mining
Co., supra, the plaintiff mining company argued that the order of the War
Production Board in 1942, directing all nonessential gold mines to cease
operating, amounted to a taking of its right to mine gold. The Court noted
that the purpose of the order was to conserve equipment and manpower for
essential war uses, and that, therefore, the regulation was not arbitrary or
unreasonable. In accordance with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Eureka, we feel that certain governmental actions which might appear to be
a taking should not be so labeled when they are the result of a wartime
situation.
The plaintiff here argued that, for all practical purposes, there was no
longer a wartime situation in existence at the time of the Potsdam Agree-
ment on August 2, 1945. For instance, it pointed out that open hostilities
had ceased with the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces
on May 8, 1945. However, it seems to be generally well-accepted that the
mere cessation of hostilities does not necessarily terminate the war power.
Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947).
The war power continues past the end of hostilities and into that period
during which the evils which gave rise to the hostilities are sought to be
remedied. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S.
146, 163 (1919); Steward v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 509 (1870).
Moreover, it was not until December 31, 1946, more than a year after
Potsdam, that the President declared an end to armed hostilities.' 6
Plaintiff further argued that it was entitled to recover based on Seery v.
United States, 130 Ct. Cf. 481, 127 F.Supp. 601 (1955), Turney v. United
States, 126 Ct. Cl. 202, 115 F. Supp. 457 (1953), and Gray v. United
16 Proclamation No. 2714, 61 Stat. 1048 (1947).
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States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886). In Seery, the distinguishing factor is that the
plaintiff's land, which was taken in 1945 by American military forces for
use as an officers' club, was located in Austria, and the court noted that not
only was Austria not enemy territory at the time of the taking, but also that
Austria had never been considered to be enemy territory. In the instant
case, there can be no question but that the territory containing plaintiffs
East German plant was located in what the United States considered as
"enemy territory." The important point decided by the court in Turney was
that the just compensation clause applied to the taking of property not
located in the United States. Since this point is not in dispute in this case
and since Turney did not deal with a taking having a wartime purpose, the
case is not really applicable to the present controversy. All that really
needs to be said about the Gray case is that the opinion by the court was
strictly an advisory opinion which was not binding upon either of the
parties and cannot be binding upon subsequent courts. However, it is
worth mentioning that, in referring to the "French Spoliation" claims
which were later granted by Congress following the Gray opinion, the
Supreme Court remarked: "We think that payments thus prescribed to be
made were purposely brought within the category of payments by way of
gratuity, payments as of grace and not of right." Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S.
439, 457 (1896).
Plaintiff, in making its argument that there was an unlawful taking of its
property by the United States, in essence, is requesting this court to say
that that part of the Potsdam Treaty calling for the relinquishment of the
East German territory to the Russians was a violation of plaintiffs con-
stitutional rights. In other words, defendant, by signing the Potsdam
Agreement, violated the fifth amendment, since supposedly it was at this
time that the so-called license to dismantle and remove was given to the
U.S.S.R.
The making of treaties is a power delegated to the President with the
advise and consent of the Senate. The negotiation of treaties is a matter
solely within the discretion of the President. Since the content of treaties is
so closely intertwined with political and international affairs, courts should
be hesitant to interfere in any way with the wording or intent of a treaty.
Only in cases where the Chief Executive has clearly violated a provision of
the Constitution and denied a citizen of this country his full rights should a
court seek to interfere with the treaty making power of the President. See
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21 (1870); cfMilliken v. Stone, 16 F.2d 981 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 748 (1927). Since we have already held that
there has been no taking of plaintiff's property in violation of the fifth
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amendment, there is clearly no violation of a constitutional provision by
the Potsdam Agreement. Consequently, we do not find it necessary or
provident to examine in detail the reasoning behind the decision of the
American delegation to relinquish plaintiff's property to Russia without
making a request for compensation.
Plaintiff seems to place a lot of reliance on the failure of defendant to
press for the passage of the proposal drawn up by the United States
delegation, calling for compensation of United States nationals by the
Soviet Union. However, we do not feel it is within our province, in the
absence of any clear violation of a constitutional provision, to examine the
political and diplomatic reasons for the withdrawal of this proposal by the
Secretary of State. Instead, we must assume that there was a sound basis
for this decision just as we assume that the United States Government
acted wisely and in the best interests of this country in agreeing at Potsdam
to the dividing of Germany into zones of occupation.
It would be interesting to speculate what plaintiff's position would be
had the United States presented its proposal calling for compensation, only
to have it rejected by the U.S.S.R. Would this one step have been enough
to satisfy plaintiff that the United States should not be liable for the loss of
its property? Suppose the proposal had become a part of the Potsdam
Treaty, and later Russia had refused to abide by it. Would plaintiff require
the United States to take further action to see that it received its just
compensation, or would the defendant have fulfilled its duty simply by
having made the compensation provision a part of the agreement? In other
words, what steps should defendant have taken in order not to be guilty of
the alleged taking of paintiff's property? Where does one draw the line? It
could be argued that there was always one more step the Government
could have taken to protect the property of its citizens. This court in the
early French Spoliation case of Adams v. United States, 23 Ct. Cl. 226,
253 (1888), directed itself to this question of just how far the Government
must go to protect the claims of its citizens. The court, quoting from 6
Memoirs of John Quincy Adams 383 (C. Adams ed. 1874), which was
cited in 2 A Digest of the International Law of the United States 707-08
(F. Wharton ed. 1887), stated:
A government which neglects properly to present the claim of one of its
citizens to a foreign government, in consequence of which such claim is lost,
is not necessarily bound to make good the claim. The argument of the
abstract right is strong, but as the justice obtainable ... from foreign nations is
at all times, and under every state of things, very imperfect, and as the only
alternative in cases of denial of justice is the abandonment of the claim or
war, a nation by abandoning the claim, after exhausting every specific ex-
pedient for obtaining justice, neither partakes of the injustice done nor makes
itself responsible to the sufferer; for war, even if it eventually obtains justice
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for that sufferer, secures it by the sufferings of thousands of others equally
unmerited and which must ultimately remain unindemnified. And mere in-
ability to obtain justice can not incur the obligation it is unable to enforce.
In addition to its claim founded on the fifth amendment, plaintiff also
claims compensation based on an implied contract. Plaintiff contends that
defendant impliedly agreed to compensate it for the loss of its properties in
East Germany on three separate occasions: (1) in 1945 at Potsdam when
defendant licensed the Soviets to dismantle and remove plaintiff's property;
(2) in 1946 by the Paris Reparation Agreement 17 releasing any claims
plaintiff might have against Germany for losses sustained during the war;
and (3) in 1948 as a result of the War Claims Act.
Plaintiff, in its motion for summary judgment, admitted that if there was
no valid fifth amendment claim, there would be no implied contract claim
which could be sustained on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement. We
agree; and since we have already held that there is no right of recovery
based on the fifth amendment, then obviously plaintiff's implied contract
action must also fail. See R. J. Widen Co. v. United States, supra at 992,
fn. 8; United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 459 (1903).
Plaintiff's reliance on the Paris Reparation Agreement as the basis for its
contract claim is misplaced since this agreement was a pact between the
United States and 17 of its Allies whereby each country would limit its war
claims and those of its citizens to the proceeds of certain German assets
which had been seized during the war. There is nothing in this agreement
from which a promise can be implied by the defendant to compensate
plaintiff for the loss of its German properties.
In regard to plaintiff's allegation that the War Claims Act of 1948
represented a promise by defendant to pay plaintiff for its war losses, it is
sufficient to say that, as a general rule, where the United States Govern-
ment establishes a national fund out of which claimants can assert their
claims against a foreign government, this does not in any way make the
United States liable for any unpaid portion of the claim. Instead, payments
by the United States in these situations are simply gratuities incapable of
establishing any legal liability. Cf. Bayard v. United States, 127 U.S. 246
(1888); see generally Adams v. United States, supra at 253; 3 M. White-
man, Damages in International Law 2046-51 (1943). This idea is also
supported by section 7(f) of Title I of the International Claims Settlement
Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1626(f) (1964), which provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as the assumption of any
17Agreement with Other Governments Respecting the Distribution of German Repara-
tion, the Establishment of an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, and the Restitution of Mone-
tary Gold, Jan. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 3 157 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1655.
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liability by the United States for the payment or satisfaction, in whole or in
part, of any claim on behalf of any national of the United States against any
foreign government.
As a result, we do not find that there is any basis upon which plaintiff can
contend that it is entitled to recover on an implied contract.
In light of the fact that plaintiff has been unable to establish that it is
entitled to recover based either on the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment or on an implied contract, we do not find it necessary to
consider defendant's arguments of res judicata, statute of limitations, and
finality of decisions of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. We
hold, therefore, that there has been no taking of plaintiff's East German
property by the defendant which is compensable under the just com-
pensation clause of the fifth amendment, and that the plaintiff is not entitled
to recover on the basis of an implied contract. Plaintiff's cross-motion for
summary judgment is denied; defendant's motion to dismiss is denied; and
defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff's petition is
dismissed.18
NICHOLS, Judge, concurring:
I join in the judgment of the court and in the opinion except where it is
inconsistent with what follows.
Plaintiff cites and relies heavily upon Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl.
340 (1886). This is one of the most interesting and able decisions of our
predecessors on the subject of Fifth Amendment takings, and respectfully I
do not agree with the court's handling of it. True, it was an advisory
opinion only. The alleged taking occurred in 1800, and was never within
our jurisdiction to adjudicate. The Congress, until recently, often requested
advisory opinions of this court and they were furnished, as in Gray. Such
opinions of course were not "binding" but I never supposed that lawyers
were not to invite attention to them as precedents. That is all plaintiff seeks
to do here. Moreover, the Congress chose to enact relief legislation pur-
suant to our advice ex gratia, without fully accepting our Fifth Amendment
theory or rejecting it either. The quoted language of the Supreme Court in
Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S. 439, 457 (1896) points this out, but I do not
read it as expressing any disapproval of this court's position concerning the
Fifth Amendment.
For a full appreciation of the logical structure the Gray opinion erects,
there can be no substitute for reading it, but the following summary is
attempted. In 1778, seeking to obtain the French alliance that ultimately
made possible the victory at Yorktown, our Government made various
18See note II supra for the court's disposition of plaintiff's Czechoslovakian claim.
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promises by treaty. Among them was one that we would thenceforward
defend the French West Indian possessions against attack by any other
power. In the wars of the French Revolution and Empire commencing in
1793, the British attacked and captured several of those possessions with-
out our Government's lifting a finger. There were doubtless good reasons
for this, but the impression in Paris was painful. Our merchant shipping
during the time of those wars was large, and it was for the most part
undefended. Many American ships were taken by the combatants, some in
the exercise of lawful belligerent rights, some otherwise. The French cap-
tured maybe more than their share. The "quasi-war" with France was an
effort to give our flag afloat some protection against the French. In 1800
we sent a delegation to Paris to negotiate outstanding differences. They
brought up the "French Spoliation Claims," as they were always after-
wards called, for lawless captures of shipping. The French responded with
their complaint that we had not observed our 1778 commitment, a grave
breech of faith as they viewed it. It looked as if this albatross would hang
from our national neck from that time onward unless a release was pur-
chased. Having nothing else to purchase it with, our negotiators used the
spoliation claims. A treaty surrendering them and releasing our 1778 prom-
ise was duly made and the Senate ratified it in due course.
This court considered that under international law many of the claims
were valid and would eventually have been honored. Similar claims against
other countries were, in fact, settled and paid by them, as were claims
against France herself that accrued after 1800. The holders of certain
particular claims were thus singled out to make a sacrifice for the general
good that was not required of others similarly situated. We held that their
property had been taken without just compensation.
Many statesmen of the generation that wrote the Bill of Rights were of
the opinion that a Fifth Amendment taking had occurred. A smaller num-
ber were of a contrary view. The matter was agitated but progress towards
its resolution was not made until the Congressional request to this court for
an advisory opinion, in 1885.
It would appear as an unspoken major premise that claimants were able
in 1880 to invoke canons of international law that were generally agreed
upon, canons which no important maritime nation would put itself in the
position of repudiating. These assumptions still stood as valid in 1886. The
retreat of law from the oceans has been since then, so precipitate, that it is
difficult for us now to put ourselves into the state of mind of the Gray
court, but to understand the decision we must do so. To apply it as a
precedent today, we must consider to what extent conditions have changed
and to what extent they remain the same.
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Gray thus appears to me to teach a technique rather than a rule. To
follow it, we would have to piece together the historical elements, patiently
and carefully, item by item, as the Gray court did, until finally a structure
stands that is or is not recognizable as a Fifth Amendment taking. Plaintiff
has not undertaken to show us how to do this. It seems to imagine that
every decision of our Government for whatever reasons not to try to
protect the property of United States citizens against spoliation abroad, is a
Fifth Amendment taking. The Gray court would have been the first to
repudiate such a notion and the whole course of its reasoning is to the
contrary. This court today quotes John Quincy Adams to good effect, a
passage used with approval as the court says in Adams v. United States, 23
Ct. Cl. 226, 253 (1888). It remains to add that the same Judge, John Davis,
was the author of both the Gray and Adams opinions. From this fact, with
the nearness in time, we may be sure that the then Court of Claims saw no
conflict between the quotation and its holding in Gray, and indeed there is
none.
It appears to me that to satisfy the Gray court, plaintiff here would have
had to show as a minimum (a) That the acts of the USSR in seizing United
States owned plants in East Germany as "reparations" were contrary to
international law, (b) that the USSR's authorities would sooner or later
have acknowledged the fact and paid compensation to the United States
owners, and (c) that the United States representatives at Potsdam
knowingly surrendered this possibility of compensation in return for con-
cessions by the USSR in unrelated areas. Plaintiff has not even demon-
strated proposition (a), still less the others.
I do not agree that the Gray decision is any kind of cloud or embarrass-
ment on the decision we reach today, and therefore I see no need to
consider if it was correctly decided. If it was, and should be regarded as a
valid precedent, the decision we reach is not altered.
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